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The Rule of Law in the Reform of Legal Education : 
Teaching the Legal Mind in Japanese Law Schools 
James R. MAXEINER* 
Introductory Remarks 
I would like to thank your faculty and Kansai University for so generously 
sponsoring my visit here. Professors Yamanaka and lmanishi are responsible for 
my coming to Kansai in the first place. Professors Kubo and Takeshita arranged 
for my addresses today. Professors Takigawa and Yamanaka have literally taken 
me by the hand to assure that I find my way about Japan. All of you have been 
terrific hosts. I am having a very productive and happy visit. Nothing is lacking. 
I only hope someday to return your kindness. 
I would like to note, too, that Professor Yamanaka and I met in Munich over 
twenty years ago when we were both fellows of the Alexander von Humboldt 
Foundation. The spirit of the Humboldt Foundation is behind this talk today. 
1. Introduction 
This must be an exiting time to be a law professor in Japan! According to 
national policy "greatly increasing the legal population is an urgent task."1l A new 
legal training system is being established and at its "core" are to be the new law 
schoolsりWithinfifteen years, the legal population is to increase by 150% or 
more-from about 20,000 now to 50,000 or more lawyers, judges and prosecutors 
in 2018.3) You are needed. And there is nothing better for one's self-confidence 
than to be needed. 
This rapid increase in the number of lawyers means that in only a few years, 
* Visiting Scholar, Kansai University Faculty of Law(Spring Semester 2003) ; Visiting Associate 
Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City (2003-2004) ; Associate Professor of Law, 
University of Baltimore School of Law (from Fall Term 2004). J. D. (Cornell), LL. M. (George-
town), Dr. jur. (Munich). The author can be reached at maxeiner@att.net. 
1) Justice System Reform Council, Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council For a 
Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century, June 12, 2001, Chap. III, Part 1, l. 
2) Id. at Chap. III, Part 1. 
3) Id. at Chap. III, Part 1, l. In this talk I refer to al three branches of the profession as ,,lawyers." 
64 
KANSAI UNIV. REV. L. & PoL No. 25, MAR 2004 
lawyers trained under the new system will account for the majority of al lawyers 
in Japan. Your country has quite literally charged you with the task of building 
the legal profession. 
This is such an exciting development for legal education that even a foreign 
visitor such as myself cannot resist commenting on it. I realize that I know no 
Japanese and have litle knowledge of Japanese law and history. Yet I request 
your indulgence and ask that you allow me-as an outsider-to comment on 
these developments. Much of what I have to say may be obvious to you. But I 
hope that I may either bring to you new insights or perhaps just confirm for you 
conclusions that you have already reached. 
My perspective as an outsider is somewhat different from that of other 
outsiders in two respects. I am reasonably familiar not only with my own legal 
system, the American, but also with the other foreign legal system most closely 
followed in Japan, the German. Moreover, my perspective is not only that of a 
scholar, but also that of a practitioner who has been active in international 
practice. In fact, I have spent more time as a practitioner than as a scholar. My 
practice career has spanned three principal areas of practice, as a government 
lawyer for the United States Department of Justice, as a private lawyer for 
international law firms in New York City, and as in house Associate General 
Counsel of a major American corporation. 
2. My thesis summarized 
Here in summary is my thesis today: 
a. The Rule of Law is at the heart of the present legal reform. 
b. There is an international consensus about basic elements of the Rule of 
Law. 
c. Legal methods are central to the Rule of Law. But different legal methods 
are used to realize the Rule of Law. 
d. Teaching legal methods, i.e., teaching to think like a lawyer, is at the heart 
of that which is professional in legal education. 
e. The present legal reform invites you to teach legal methods. It is my 
opinion, as an outsider, that you should seize the opportunity to do 
that— even more than before-and you should work actively to develop the 
future Rule of Law in Japan. 
I intend to address these points sequentially. In some instances, I will draw 
upon examples from Germany and the United States and discuss my imperfect 
understanding of Japanese law. 
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3. The Rule of Law is at the heart of the present legal reform 
The Rule of Law is at the heart of the pending legal reform. The Justice 
System Reform Council Report could hardly be clearer on this point. Chapter I 
states : 
... [T] his Council has determined that the fundamental task for reform of 
the justice system is to define clearly "what we must do to transform both the 
spirit of the law and the rule of law into the flesh and blood of this country, 
so that they become'the shape of our country." . _4l 
The theme of the Rule of Law runs like a leitmotif through the entire Report. The 
Report notes that the Rule of Law is an "essential base" for converting from an 
advance control system to an "after-the-fact review/remedy type society"5l that 
permits each and every person to "break out of the consciousness of being a 
governed object and [to] become a governing subject, with autonomy and bearing 
social responsibility ... ,,5) 
4. International consensus on some basic elements of the Rule of Law 
The Rule of Law is central to the legal systems of Japan, Germany and the 
United States. In Germany it is referred to as the Rechtsstaatsprinzip, but the two 
concepts are substantially the same.7l There is an international consensus as to 
some of the basic requirements of the Rule of Law : law should be clear. It 
should be publicly promulgated and prospective. Law should be stable. A mech-
anism for its implementation should permit a predictable decision in the individ叫
case. Law must be capable of guiding those subject to it, and, for law to be 
capable of guiding the subject, it must also protect the individ叫 fromarbitrary 
use of power to make and apply law. When the Rule of Law is safeguarded, the 
subject can rely on the law and can foresee application of state power.8l 
4) Id. Chapter I. (Further in Chapter I : "This reform of the justice system aims to tie these various 
reforms together organically under "the rule of law" that is one of the fundamental concepts on 
which the Constitution is based. Justice system reform should be positioned as the "final linchpin" 
of a serious of various reforms concerning restructuring of "the shape of our country.") 
5) Id. Chap. I, Part 3, 3. 
6) Id. Chap. I. 
7) Neil MacCormick, Der Rechtsstaat und die rule of law, Juristenzeitung 1984, 65; Neil MacCormick, 
Questioning Sovereignty 9 (1999); Erhard Denninger, "Rechtsstaat" oder "Rule of law"一叫sist das 
heute?, in Festschrift fuer K. Luederssen (2001). 
8) See Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law chap. 2 (rd ed. 1969) ; Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie/ 
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The Rule of Law is not an absolute value. Its demands all too soon conflict 
with the ability to generalize in rules. Gustav Radbruch observed the tension : 
"Legal security requires positive law, but positive law demands application 
without regard to its justice and utility."9) At times the Rule of Law gives way to 
other interests, namely to justice or utility (i.e., general welfare). Examples are the 
use of general clauses and of retrospective legislation.10l Different legal systems 
have different ways to permit this needed flexibility. But if that flexibility becomes 
too great, the Rule of Law is at risk. 
5. Legal methods are central to the Rule of Law 
The Rule of Law is concerned with how the law is actually applied, that is, 
with legal methods. What is a legal method? It is a way to reach a substantive 
decision of a legal question.11) Legal methods bring law and facts together to 
govern a concrete case. Legal methods are concerned with two principal aspects 
of law: how law is stated and the mechanisms by which law is applied.12l In the 
United States one speaks of rules and of courts or judicial process. In Germany, 
one speaks of Orientierungs-and of Realisierungssicherheit. I suspect that similar 
distinctions are made here in Japan. 
Most lawyers have only a vague idea of differences in legal methods.13) Legal 
methods are rarely taught comparatively. One learns one's own legal method 
'-..§9 (8th ed. 1973); Ken Takeshita, The Modernization of the Japanese Legal System, 19 Kansai 
University Review of Law and Politics 1, 8-9 (1998) ; Keiichi Yamanaka, Staatsraison versus 
Rechtstat. Zur v吋asungshistorischenBedeutung der Otsu-Affaere, 29 Verfassung und Recht in 
Uebersee 215 (1996); Swiss Constitution of 18 April 1999, Art. 5 ("Grundlage und Schranke 
staatlichen Handelns ist das Recht.") 
9) Radbruch, op. cit. at 166. 
10) Se James R. Maxeiner, Policy and Methods in German and American Antitrust Law: A 
Comparative Study 12-13 (1986) ; James Maxeiner, Rechtspolitik und Method en im deutschen 
und amerikanischen Kartellrecht : eine vergleichende Betrachtung Kap. 2 (1986). 
11) Se 1 Fikentscher, Die Methoden des Rechts in vergleichender Darstellung xix (1975-1977), 4 id. 
121; James R. Maxeiner, Policy and Methods, op. cit.; Gutram Rahn, Rechtsdenken und 
Rechtsauffassung in Japan dargestellt an der Entwicklung der modernischen japanischen 
Zivilrechtsmethodik 3 (1990). 
12) Cf John Owen Haley, Authority Without Power: Law and the Japanese Paradox 5 (1994) ("By 
definition, al legal systems, Japan's included, comprise two primary elements—norms and 
sanctions-and the related institutions for making and enforcing legal rules.") 
13) Elsewhere I have sought to increase awareness of foreign legal methods. Se James R. Maxeiner, 
U.S. "methods awareness" for German Jurists, in Bernhard Grossfeld et. al, (eds.), Festschrift fuer 
Wolfgang Fikentscher 114 (1998); Legal Methods Awareness and japan in an Era of Global Electronic 
Commerce, An Address to the Faculty of Law of the Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan, June 
19, 2003. 
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when one learns to "think like a lawyer". The idea of the "legal mind" is found 
around the world, but it does not mean the same thing everywhere. Lawyers work 
with their own legal methods without thinking about them.14) 
Legal systems of different countries use different legal methods to realize the 
Rule of Law. Some systems place comparatively more emphasis on the role of 
rules while others place comparatively more emphasis on the role of courts. Some 
are more willing to allow the Rule of Law to give way for individual justice, while 
others are more likely to allow departures from the Rule of Law for interests of the 
general welfare. These differences are apparent in a cursory examination of legal 
methods in Germany, the United States and Japan. 
a. German Legal Methods 
The classic subsumption model is at the heart of German legal methods.15) In 
the German model, law is a system of rules. In German understanding jurisprudence 
is a "science of norms."16) The legal rules are part of an abstract legal order that 
governs al behavior. The legal order is a structure of ought-norms. The idea of 
their message is not to describe facts, but to prescribe conduct.17) This objective 
order is contrasted to subjective rights of individual subjects. A rule of law takes 
the form of a statement. Hence it is called, in German, a Rechtssatz (i.e., "law-
sentence"). A complete legal norm consists of two parts : a Tatbestand and a legal 
consequence (Rechtsfolge). The Tatbestand is an abstract description of a particular 
situation. The legal norm takes the form : whenever the Tatbestand (T) is realized 
in a concrete factual situation, then a certain legal consequence (R) applies. This 
is the major premise. The minor premise is that this particular factual situation S 
fulfils the requirements of the Tatbestand T, that is, it is a case of T. The conclusion 
then logically follows that for the factual situation S, legal consequence R applies. 
In Germany judges apply law to facts. They learn the skill of drafting a 
judgment, the so-called "relationship" or "judgment technique" (Relationstechnik or 
Urteilstechnik). Foreign jurists learning German law are advised : "A German 
judgment is supposed to appear as an act of an impartial as well as imperso叫
public authority furnishing the official and objective interpretation rather than 
being based on the personal opinions of the deciding justices. . .The typical 
14) Se, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Praejudizienrecht und Rechtsprechung in Amerika 2 (1933), 
translated as The Case Law System in America 2 (M. Ansaldi transl. 1989) ("Handling precedents 
is a matter of tradecraft, an art one learns from experience. . . One learns this from study, from 
the practice of law, in general from life as a lawyer. But litle thought is given to what one is 
learning."). 
15) Karl Larenz, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft 150 (5th ed., 1983). 
16) Id. at 187. 
17) Reinhold Zippellius, Einfuehrung in die juristische Methodenlehre 12 (3d ed., 1980). 
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German judgment strives after the ideal of deductive reasoning."18) The two 
principal substantive parts of the judgment are the Tatbestand and the Entscheidungs-
griinde. The Tatbestand, as it appears in a judgment, is a short statement of the 
19) parties'legal claims and assertions of fact. From the Tatbestand, it should be 
possible to determine quickly who is seeking what, from whom, on what ground 
and to determine which matters are in dispute and which are not.20) The 
Entscheidungsgriinde is a summary of the considerations for the decision.21) It is to 
evaluate and subsume the concrete facts of the Tatbestand under the abstract 
elements of the applicable norm.22) 
The highly-stylized German judgment is designed to assure that the parties 
understand the grounds for the court's decision.23) Ideally the judgment will 
convince the party losing the lawsuit that that loss is the correct outcome砂 Ata
minimum, the judgment should persuade the loser that the process was ratio叫
The party affected by the judgment should be enabled to rationally reproduce the 
grounds for the decision. He should recognize, that not arbitrariness, but rational 
argumentation determined the judgment.25) In this way the parties are guaranteed 
the constitutional right to equal treatment under the law (Article 3) and the 
constitutional right to be heard (rechtliches Gehor, Article 103(1)).26) The judgment 
also controls the judges.27) If judges fail to subsume the facts of the case under the 
applicable law properly, their decision is subject to correction on appeal. The 
judgment demonstrates whether the judges understood the losing party's position; 
through its impersonal and colorless nature, it demonstrates the judges' 
neutrality. 28) 
b. Ameri~an Legal Methods 
The American legal system emphasizes the judicial process more than rules. 
While the German legal system is expected to provide an objectively correct legal 
18) Reinhard Zimmermann, An Introduction to German Legal Culture, in Werner Ebke & Matthew 
Finkin (eds.), Introduction to German Law 1, 21 (1996). 
19) ZPO [Zivilprozessordnung]§313 I ; Egon Schneider, Der Zivilrechtsfal in Pruefung und Praxis 
186 (6th ed., 1974). 
20) Schneider, op. cit. at 185. 
21) ZPO§313 III. 
2) Guenther Schmitz et al. (eds.), Die Station in Zivilsachen 90 (1986). 
23) Baumbach/Lauterbach/Albers/Hartmann, Zivilprozessordnung§313, margin no. 3 (53d ed., 
1995). 
24) Kurt Schellhammer, Die Arbeitsmethode des Zivilichters 241 (7th ed., 1984). 
25) Peter Raisch, J uristische Method en vom antiken Rom bis zur Gegenwart 121 (1995). 
26) Baumbach/Lauterbach/Albers/Hartmann ZPO§313, margin no. 3. 
27) Schellhammer, op. cit. at 242; Schmitz et al. op. cit. at 83. 
28) Schneider, op. cit. at 178-79. 
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answer, the American legal system is expected to provide procedures to resolve 
disputes about what subjective rights are. The focus of American legal methods is 
dispute resolution. The concept of legal order in the German sense of an abstract 
order that governs al behavior has disappeared.29) 
Rule skepticism dominates American legal thinking and legal instruction. A 
half century ago, Professor and later U. S. Attorney General Edward Levi in the 
classic work on legal method in the United States, denied that the subsurnption 
model applies in America : " [I]t cannot be said that the legal process is the 
application of known rules to diverse facts. "30l Much of American legal theory is 
concerned with upholding departures from rules. One characteristic of the 
American legal system is said to be the "open modification of the rule to allow 
purposes or policies to be taken into account."31) A foreign observer, my German 
Doktorvater Wolfgang Fikentscher, has noted the positive side of this approach to 
rules : "The program is not rule antagonism, but flexibility of rules and 
adaptability of the system in order to meet ... the need of the hour."32) There are 
many areas in American law where there are "legitimate departures from rules," 
e.g., "jury nullification" (where juries are permitted to decide against the law) and 
"prosecutorial discretion" (where prosecutors are permitted to decide when to 
enforce laws) _3l American legal scholars see these departures from rules as virtues 
that permit decision makers to take into account individ叫 circumstancesthat 
would be insufficiently appreciated by rule-bound decisions.34) 
The American legal system places great weight on values related to the 
fairness of the process. It is especially concerned that the parties have notice of al 
29) See James R. Maxeiner, U.S. "methods a四 reness"op cit. 
30) Edward Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning at 3 (1949). 
31) P. S. Attiyah & Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law 91 (1987). 
Roscoe Pound advocated an "equitable application of the law" which conceived of the legal rule 
"as a general guide to the judge, leading him toward the just result, but insist [ing] that within 
wide limits he should be free to deal with the individual case, so as to meet the demands of justice 
between the parties and accord with the general reason of ordinary men." The Scope and Purpose of 
Sociological jurisprudence Il, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 515 (1912). 
32) 2 Fikentscher, op. cit. at 465. 
33) Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 148, 153 (1996). 
34) See, e.g., Mortimer R. Kadish & Sanford H. Kadish, Discretion to Disobey: A Study of Lawful 
Departures from Legal Rules (1973) ; Sunstein, op. cit., substantially incorporating Cass R. 
Sunstein, Problems叫thRules, 83 Cal. L. Rev. 953 (1995) ("One of my principal goals in this 
Article is to respond to a pervasive social phenomenon : extravagant enthusiasm for rules and an 
extravagantly rule-bound conception of the rule of law."); F. Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 Stan. L. 
Rev. 633, 634 (1995) ("at times it is better not to give reasons than to give them"); Guido 
Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes at 180 (1982) ("One should recognize openly 
that courts are exercising the power to allocate legislative inertia and to decide whether statutes 
deserve a retentionist or a revisionist bias."). 
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proceedings; that the judge and the jury are completely neutral and unprejudiced; 
that no proceedings take place without al parties'having the opportunity to be 
involved ; and above al, that each party has a full, fair and ample opportunity to 
present "its case", i.e., its version of the whole matter. These factors legitimate 
the proceeding. Appellate review is concerned with whether the rules of procedure 
were followed and not with the actual factual findings. The system is designed to 
assure the fairness of the process more than the correctness of the result.35) 
c. Japanese Legal Methods 
The form of Japanese legal methods is close to German methods. Reading 
Japanese scholars on Japanese civil procedure and legal methods, one might 
assume that there is a very close congruence的 Muchas in Germany, judges are 
trained in a technique of writing judgments to apply law to facts. 
A German scholar, Gutram Rahn, however takes issue with this view. In his 
Rechtsdenken und. Rechtsauffasung in Japan dargestellt an der Entwicklung der modernen 
japanischen Zivilrechtsmethodik (1990) Rahn concludes that Japanese jurists have 
rejected the German legal-subsumption method.37) In its place, he says, there is a 
method that is distinctly Japanese. Rahn's fundamental contention is that a legal 
judgment in Japanese understanding consists of two separate and independent acts. 
There is first an act of decision (Entscheidungsakt) ; itconsists of a value judgment 
of all competing interests. Only after reaching that decision is the court then to 
justify that decision in its judgment in a separate act of justification (Entscheidungs-
begruendung). Unclear according to Rahn is the extent to which the court in justifying 
its decision is to explain and support its initial value judgment, who should win.38) 
35) Se, e.g., Schlesinger/Bradley, CBS Reports: Enter the Jury Room, first broadcast April 16, 1997 
(transcript and video tape available) ("If the American jury system promises anything, it is not a 
fair outcome, only a fair process.") 
36) Se, e.g., Muneo Nakamura, A{y Theory about Judgment, first published in 1965, and A Comparative 
Study of Judicial Proces, first published in 1958, both reprinted in Hideo Nakamura (ed.), Muneo 
Nakamura, Collected・Works on Civil Procedure (1994); Hideo Nakamura, Die japanische ZPO in 
deutscher Sprache Mit einer Einfuehrung in das japanische Zivilprozessrecht (1978). 
37) Gutram Rahm, op cit. at 2. 
38) Id. at 327 (,Die moderne japanische Zivilrechtsmethodik umfasst zwei voneinander unabhaengige 
Verfahrensschritte : den Entscheidungsakt und die Entscheidungsbegruendung. Die Entscheidung 
selbst wird durch ein Werturteil getroffen dem eine Abwaegung aler vom Rechtsstreit beruehrten 
Interessen vorangeht. Das Gesetz ist dabei nur ein unverbindliches Kriterium neben anderen. 
Entscheidend kommt es darauf an, dass das Werturteil dem gesunden Menschen verstand des 
japanischen Volkes entspricht. Im zweiten Verfahrensschritt wird die bereits getroffene Entscheidung 
als Mittel der U eberzeugung aufgrund des Gesetzes juristisch konstruiert. U nklar bleibt, in 
welchem U nfang die ,su bstan tiel en'Entscheid ungsgruende-In teressenabwaegung und 
Werturteil-offenzulegen sind. Die Forderung nach Offenlegung wird im Prinzip erhoben, aber 
dem Ueberzeugungszweck der Begruendung untergeordnet.") 
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The court's value jりdgment,according to Rahn,39) is not to be an arbitrary 
decision. The judge 1s to weigh the interests of the parties to the law suit and of 
other parties interested to reach the correct conclusion. The written law is, in this 
decision, only one aspect of the harmony that is to be sought. The decision must 
not contradict the general understanding of the people (gesunden Menschenverstand des 
Laienー shirotono joshiki―素人の常識）.40l Whether the court is to lay open this 
value judgment explicitly is debated.41) 
Other German scholars that are familiar with Japan agree with Rahn.42) An 
American, who presumably is not familiar with German legal methods, also supports 
Rahn's thesis. Carl F. Goodman is his new book, The Rule of Law in Japan: A 
Comparative Analysis, observes that frequently in Japanese law, "what you see is not 
what you get." According to Goodman, Japanese judges are to decide in "a way 
that is satisfactory to the Japanese publicー ina manner consistent with cultural 
values, myths (if need be), and societal norms that may be different from norms 
that exist in the United States. . .To be consistent with these values, a decision 
may not reflect a syll~gistic analysis of abstract logic. A decision must take account 
of the circumstances m which the parties presently find themselves and legal rules 
must be pliable to reflect the context in which the parties and the rule exist."43l 
39) Id. at 366. 
40) Id. at 327. 
41) Id. at 345. 
42) See, e.g., Axel Schwarz, Vom Wert des Lebens und der Normen, in Heinrich Menkhaus (ed.), Das 
Japanische im japanischen Recht 63, 76-77 (1994) (,,Die Betrachtung zum Zivilrecht: Allgemein-
er Tei! und Schuldrecht bestaetigt den Befund Gutram Rahns zur Methode der japanischen 
Rechtspraxis: Die Rechtsanwendung wird nicht <lurch die Wertung des Gesetzeswortlauts, 
sondern <lurch das Werturteil des Richters determiniert. Entscheidungsfindung und Rechtferti-
~ung der Entscheidung fallen auseinander. Ein richterliches Beduerfniss, eine Entscheidung 
JUristisch unter Berufung auf eine Vorschrift sozusagen zu untermauern, scheint nicht zu geben. ") 
43) Carl S. Goodman, The Rule of Law in Japan: A Comparative Analysis 2, 4 (2003) ("But to 
Japanese judges, whose experience is fundamentally different from the American experience, the 
discretion is to be exercised in a way that is satisfactory to the Japanese publicー ina manner 
consistent with cultural values, myths (if need be), and societal norms that may be different from 
norms that exist in the United States. To be consistent with these values, a decision may not 
reflect a syllogistic analysis of abstract logic. A decision must take account of the circumstances in 
which the parties presently find themselves and legal rules must be pliable to reflect the context in 
which the parties and the rule exist." Further, " .... [J] udges are now being asked to interpret 
laws, Codes and Constitutions written by other societies with other values and, in a sense forced 
on Japanese society. When these Codes, Constitutions and laws are deemed to conflict with 
fundamental Japanese values or with Japanese historic norms or with myths accepted by the 
J apancse it is natural for judges to read these laws in a way which is consistent with these norms, 
values and myths. More is involved here than a strained interpretation of words. If need be a 
wholesale re-writing of the law by the judge may be called for and written provisions of the law 
will be sacrificed for the'greater Japanese'good.") 
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Among your colleagues I have found litle support, either in theory or 
practice, for Rahn's thesis. Most Japanese jurists with whom I have spoken insist 
that Japanese judges are bound by the law and do not feel compelled first to make 
separate extra-legal value decisions. They tel me that the national Legal Training 
and Research Institute does not teach that judges are first to evaluate the overall 
merits of the case outside the law, but teaches judgment techniques similar to 
German techniques.44) They inform me that in their classes they do not teach rule 
skepticism, but rules that they teach are binding. 
A couple of your colleagues, however, have granted that Rahn's thesis just 
possibly might have some merit in civil procedure. They have hastened to add 
that it has no application to criminal procedure, which is subject to the strict rule 
of nulla crime sine lege. And while I have yet to find a Japanese scholar who has 
published a direct response in English or German to Rahn,45) I have found some 
publications by Japanese scholars in European languages that do tend to support 
Rahn's conclusions. Among them is one by my gracious host, Professor Yamanaka. 
In an article on the origins of the Rule of Law in Japan in the Otsu Affair of the 
19th century, he reports that in Japan there is a widely held view that statutory 
law is only a fai;ade ripe for interpretation.46) Takeyoshi Kawashima of the University 
of Tokyo in an address in the United States was more directly supportive of 
Rahn's analysis of Japanese legal methods. He told Americans that: "In Japan it 
is understood from the beginning of a legal enactment that the meaning of law is 
changeable and not definite. This appears to be a peculiarly Japanese characteris-
tic of legal thinking."47) Kawashima made a very interesting criticism : "this 
semantic tradition is Japan is really contradictory to the basic values which are 
required for a modern, democratic society which needs predictable judicial decisions. 
44) Cf Akira Ishikawa, Training, Appointment and Number of Judges, in Gottfried Baumgaertel, 
Grundprobleme des Zivilprozessrechts Band 2 Qapanisches Recht Band 19) 3-5 (1985) (describing 
the training received by judges); Jun'ichi Murakami, Argumentation und Abwaegung, in Heinrich 
Menkhaus (ed.), op. cit., at 89, 90 (criticicizing the Rahn thesis: ,Liegt die Absicht der ,Struk-
turierenden Rechtslehre'darin, die Erzeugung der Rechtsnorm als ,rechtsstaatlich rueckgebundenen 
Prozess'zu begreifen, so waere sie in der japanischen Rechtspraxis nicht liecht zu verwirklichen, in 
der nach Schwarz ,gesunder Menschenverstand'und ,ausserrechtliche Argumente'eine entscheidene 
Rolle spielen. Im Gestalt des japanischen Richters einen ,Rechtsbearbeiter'im Sinne der ,Struk-
turierenden Rechtslehre'zu finden, waere dann ohne Zweifel unmoeglich. Der Richter wuerde 
vielmehr stets im normgeloesten Raum bewegen, den die ,Strukturierende Rechtslehre'moeglichst 
begrenzen wil."). 
45) The closest comment in that direction I have found is that of Jur'ichi Murakami, op. cit. 
46) Keiichi Yamanaka, op. cit. at 235 ("In Japan herrscht immer noch die Vorstellung, dass das 
Gesetz fuer die Auslegung nur eine Fassade bilde. An sich sei das Gesetz nur unnuetzer Schmuck, 
es lebe erst in der Handhabung durch den Menschen."). 
47) Takeyoshi Kawashima, Japanese Way of Legal Thinking, International Journal of Law Libraries 
127, 131 (1979). Cf Rahn, op. cit. at 18, 352. 
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Sooner or later we will have to change our traditional attitude toward the meaning 
of words, especially in our laws." 
Over and over again in its Report the Justice System Reform Council stresses 
the need for "predictable, highly clear and fair rules."48) I think it is fair for me to 
ask you, does that not mean that the Commission has accepted the view of 
Kawashima that Japan sh叫 dchange its traditional attitude toward words in 
statutes? Does it not suggest that there might just be something to the argument 
of Rahn and Goodman? I express no view on the merits of Japanese legal 
methodsー Istil know too litle about them-certainly the criticisms of Rahn and 
Goodman, which are not casual, but carefully worked through, suggest that there 
is need for Japanese jurists better to explain their methods to foreigners. And that 
is a need generally recognized in Report, when the Commission identifies as on.e 
reason for reform is its concern that Japan "occupy an'honored place in 
mternat10nal society'(the Preamble to the Constitution) . " 49) 
6. Teaching legal methods is at the heart of the professional 
in legal education 
This brief sketch of legal methods shows that legal methods are different in 
different countries that al embrace the Rule of Law. Elsewhere I have addressed 
at length, that even though legal methods are quite different in Germany and the 
United States, yet in both countries the teaching of those methods is at the heart 
of what is professional in legal education. so) The lawyer's craft is bringing law and 
facts together. Learning that skil is one aspect of legal education that many 
students find most exciting. 
a. Education of lawyers in Germany 
In Germany, the system of legal education was established to train civil 
servants for the State.51) All persons who wish to become legal professionals, 
whether as lawyers or as judges or otherwise, are trained as judges. The image of 
the judge colors the ideal of the legal professional. In Germany a person who 
wishes to become a lawyer must study for a minimum of seven to nine semesters 
48) Justice System Reform Council, op. cit. at Chap. I, Part 2, 1. 
49) Justice System Reform Council, op. cit. at Chap. I, Part 1. 
50) The Professional in Legal Education : Foreign Perspectives, An Address to the Faculty of Law of the 
Himeji Dokkyo-University, Himeji, Japan, June 26, 2003 Himeji International Forum of Law and 
Politics, No. 38, 244 (2003). 
51) See Reinhard Zimmermann, An Introduction to German Legal Culture, in Introduction to German 
Law 28 (W. Ebke & Matthew Finkin eds. 1996); Ranieri, op. cit. at 832 ("Das preuBische Refe-
rendariatsmodell ... pragt heute noch das deutsche Justiz-und Rechtssystem.") 
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at a German law faculty and then may take the first state exam. Those students 
that do so successfully-and most do-are admitted to a two-year period of 
practical training sponsored by the courts of the various German states. 
In Germany law students learn the substance of the law at the university. In 
their university studies students take courses in perspective, core and specialist 
knowledge. In the subsequent practical training period prospective lawyers learn 
practical skills. They learn the Relationstechnik of relating facts to law and of 
crafting judgments. Judges as classroom teachers didactically teach classes that 
lay out the fundamentals of this technique, while individual judges, at least in 
theory, tutor the aspiring legal professionals, the Referendare or interns, as 
apprentice judges. The interns learn how・to take the substance of the law they 
learned at the university, how to conduct legal proceedings to determine facts, and 
how to justify in legal judgments their correct determinations of how law applies 
to particular cases. To some extent, they began this work already at the 
university.52) In short, they learn to do what a judge has to do. And it is the 
mastery of the techniques of applying law to facts (Relationstechnik) that defines the 
judge.53) The role of the German judge is to determine facts, to apply the law to 
those facts, and to state those conclusions in a formal judgment. 
I myself have informally taken part in the classroom portion of the Referendars' 
training. I believe that the skills imparted in the Relationstechnik and the training 
to be a judge are valuable for al future jurists. 
b. Education of lawyers in the United States 
In the United States the system of legal education was established to train 
lawyers for practice. All persons who wish to become legal professionals, whether 
as lawyers or as judges or otherwise, are trained as lawyers. The image of the 
lawyer as advocate colors the ideal of the legal professional 
In the United States someone who wishes to become a lawyer must 
52) Fikentscher has explained it this way: in the university students learn the "non-litigious opinion 
style" and in the internship period the "litigious opinion style". (Stil des unstreitigen Gutachtens and 
Stil des streitigen Gutachtens respectively). Interns learn to handle cases with varying sets of facts and 
subject to different claims, objections, replications, etc. They put the many different relevant non-
litigious opinions into one litigious opinion from which they then extract a judgment : "the judge 
renders a decision,'a judgment, and this decision is the litigious opinion turned upside down, 
namely, beginning with the outcome, continuing with the legal rules that support the claims, 
objections, rejoinders,, and duplicas, and竺竺り匹withthe subsumption. This is presented claim by 
claim, objection by objection, rejoinder by rejoinder, duplica by duplica, the whole judgment being 
arranged by claims. By contrast, as has been said, the non-litigious opinion starts with an open 
question : Could the plaintif have this claim?, continues with the subsumption, and竺生 witha 
'therefore.'" 
53) Accord, Alfred Rinken, Einft.ihrung in das jurstische Studium 135 (1977). 
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successfully graduate from an undergraduate college with a degree in almost any 
subject. Three years of law school study then follow. In the United States the 
system of university legal education began as a private substitute for an existing 
informal private system of apprenticeship training conducted by practicing 
lawyers. The apprenticeship system continued to exist alongside the university 
system for the entire nineteenth century and remained at least a theoretical 
possibility for much of the twentieth.54) Although today no law office training is 
required, relatively few students begin work independently as lawyers. More 
commonly they begin their careers as junior lawyers in law firms (associates) or 
otherwise as junior lawyers in larger organizations. The result is that most 
American law students graduate from law school with litle practical training as 
lawyers and without certification as specialists. Most get their practical training 
in on the job work. 
The first year of law school is the pride-and-joy of American law schools. 
While the courses are us叫 lythe same, it is not their substance that matters, but 
that students are taught to "think like lawyers."55l The American case method of 
legal instruction trains students to identify a precise point in controversy and to 
argue for resolving that controversy favorably. It teaches them first to find the 
legal rule relevant to the instant controversy by distilling it out of a mass of 
precedents, and then second, to argue for a favorable resolution of that point.56) 
There is no need for the student to make a legal decision let alone to place such a 
decision in any kind of system outside of the context of the particular case. Legal 
argument is the end in itself.57l The case method has been subject to much 
54) See generalりRobertStevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 
1980s (1983); Alfred Zantzinger Reed, Training for the Public Profession of the Law: Historical 
Development and Principal Contemporary Problems of Legal Education in the United States, 
Carnegie Foundation Bulletin No. 15 (1921). 
55) See Josef Redlich, The Common Law and the Case Method in American University Law 
Schools, A Report to the Carnegie Foundation, Bulletin No. 8, at 24-25 (1914). Not al law 
students believe that they are being taught to think like lawyers. See Alan Watson, Legal Education 
Reform: Modest Suggestions, 51 Journal of Legal Education 91 (2001). 
56) Redlich perceptively captured the essence of this method: "Under the old method law is taught 
to the hearer dogmatically as a compendium of logically connected principles and norms, imparted 
ready made as a unified body of established rules. Under [the case method] these rules are 
derived, step-by-step, by the students themselves by a purely analytic process which forbids a priori 
acceptance of any doctrine or system either by the teacher or by the hearer. In the former method 
al law seems firmly established and is only to be grasped, understood and memorized by the 
pupils as it is systematically laid before them. In the latter, on the other hand, everything is 
regarded as in a state of flux ; on principle, so to speak, everything is again to be brought into 
question." Redlich, op. cit. at 13. 
5 7) Richard Stith, Can Practice Do Without Theory? Differing Answers in Western Legal Education, 80 
Archiv fur Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie 426, 433 (1994). ("An excellent student is one who/' 
--一-~-- I 
76 
KANSAI U N1v. REv. L. & PoL No. 25, MAR 2004 
criticism and now is rarely used in the same manner as originally.58) 
The case law system of instruction was first introduced in 1870. It largely 
displaced the lecture method previously in use in law schools and vanquished law 
office study altogether. I believe that it did this, not because it taught law office 
skills better or the substantive law more systematically, but because it provided a 
better preparation for bringing the law and facts together. In other words, I think 
that it focused better on the kind of thinking that a lawyer must do in daily 
practice without regard to the specific type of practice that lawyer has. 
6. The challenge of the・Justice System Reform Council 
Beginning April 2004 the system of legal education in Japan will change. 
Potential lawyers who have an undergraduate education in legal studies will spend 
two years, while those with an undergraduate education in another subject will 
spend three years in professional studies at a law school. They will then take an 
examination that will accept一 asoriginally planned-some 70% to 80% of them, 
but in actuality possibly far fewer of them into the Legal Training and Research 
Institute in Tokyo. The lucky ones who are admitted will spend one year in 
practical studies mostly detailed as apprentices to civil courts, criminal courts, 
administrative agencies and private law firms. 
The Report of the Justice System Reform Council places the law schools at 
the "core" of an "organically connected" system of legal training.59) The Report 
finds in the present system a "gap between education and actual legal practice." 
It recommends that legal education, national bar examination and apprenticeship 
training al be connected as a "process." The Report expects that law schools, as 
the core of the new system, are to be "professional schools providing education 
especially for training legal professionals ... "60) They are to "build [ ] a bridge 
between theoretical education and practical education."61) 
The Report of the Justice System Reform Council in its direction that the 
',.can argue either side of a case with equal facility, who is trained to be a'hired gun'.") This (as 
well as other aspects of the litigation system) helps explain two other features of American legal 
life. (1) The party with the better lawyer should win. (2) Counseling clients is not so much about 
whether particular action is within or outside law, but about who might argue that the proposed 
action is improper and whether they would have a colorable claim. 
58) For representative views of how the case method is currently used, se David W. Leebron, The 
Philosophy of Legal Education, 19 Nihon University Comparative Law 15, 121-22 (2002); Paul D. 
Reingold, Essay: Recent Trends in American Legal Education, 15 Kwansei Gagkuin Law Review 17, 
19-20 (2001). 
59) Justice System Reform Council, Chap. III, Part 2, l. 
60) Id. 
61) Id. at Chap. III, Part 2, 2(l)b. 
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length of time that aspiring lawyers spend at the national Legal Training and 
Research Institute be reduced from what was originally two years to one year, 
states the expectation that law schools may pick up some of the instruction 
presently provided at the Institute. In particular, the Report suggests that law 
schools might cover what is now covered in the lnstitute's classroom type 
instruction in judgment drafting. It explicitly calls for ongoing readjustment of 
allocation of initial classroom instruction in judgment technique between the 
Institute and the law schools四 Oneof the basic principles of the reform is that 
the apprenticeship training should be separately implemented.63) 
The new bar examination may practically compel law schools to take on this 
responsibility. According to the Report of the Justice System Reform Council, the 
examination might become one "for which a long period of time is provided, based 
on example cases composed of diversified and complex facts, without necessarily 
being bound by traditional subject categories ... "54l 
So let me tel you what I would do, if I were you. Of course, my thoughts 
here are unburdened by knowledge of Japan or by having to live with the con-
sequences. Stil, allow me my speculation, even if you are now smiling to your-
selves and thinking, "what can he know?" 
If I were starting a law school in Japan, I would welcome taking on the 
responsibility of the Legal Training and Research Institute for teaching how to 
apply the law to the facts of a particular case. I would seek to let that training 
pervade the instruction that I offered throughout my two-year program. I think it 
is both an eminently teachable subject and one that students find interesting. 
In my Japanese law school I would take care, however, to make sure that 
that training consider the application of the law not only from the perspective of 
the judge, but also from the perspective of a lawyer who is advocating a decision 
favorable to his or her client. While providing training in thinking like a lawyer, I 
62) Id. at Chap. III, Part I, 4(1) ("How the burden of legal education should be allocated between 
the group training (the first stage at the Legal Training and Research Institute) within the 
apprenticeship training program provided following the new national bar examination and the 
educational programs provided at law schools should continue to be readjusted as appropriate in 
the future as the law schools system is being developed and taking root.") Cf, id. at Chap. III, 
Part 2, 2(2)d ("Law schools should provide educational programs that, while centered on legal 
theory that takes into account reasonable solutions to problems arising in the world of practice, 
introduce practical education (e.g., basic skills concerning factual requirements or fact finding) 
with a strong awareness of the necessity of building a bridge between legal education and legal 
theory on the basis of systematic legal theory.") ; Masato Ichikawa, Ritsumeikan UniversゅProposal
from Kyoto Private School of Law and Politics to Ritsumeikan Kyoto Law School, 18 Ritsumeikan Law 
Review 23, 42 (200 I). 
63) Justice System Reform Council, op. cit., at Chap. II, Part 2, 2(l)c. 
64) Justice System Reform Council, op. cit. at Chap. II, Part 2, 3(2). 
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would try to avoid requiring every student to learn more than the fundamentals of 
the substantive law and of basic skills. I would not want to require that al 
students learn identical technical skills. I would try to leave students free to shape 
their future legal careers. Law school cannot possibly give them al the knowledge 
and skills that they will need. At best law school can only prepare them for a 
lifetime of learning. 
I believe that good professional education in law should also be good scientific 
education. I think that legal education is at its best when its focus is on that 
which is enduring and general rather than on that which is temporal and overly 
specific. What endures are fundamentals of the substantive law, whether 
perspective, core or specialist knowledge, and above al, the key legal skill of 
thinking like a lawyer. Of course, to think like a lawyer, just as to practice any 
skil, requires substantive knowledge. A lawyer must know the basics of the legal 
system.65) The basics should be taught with attention to their historical and com-
parative law contexts. Armed with a basic knowledge of substantive law-including 
perspective knowledge一 andeducated to "think like lawyers," graduates will be able 
to go out and learn new substantive law themselves.66) Since they will practice for 
forty or more years after they leave law school, law schools owe them nothing les. 
One potential objection to taking on instruction in judgment techniques is that 
law schools may be unable to provide enough people able to teach judgment 
techniques and the legal mind. I think that objection underestimates the knowledge 
and skills that Japanese law faculties already have as well as their ability to gain new 
knowledge and skils. Japanese law faculties in their present work are already quite 
familiar with applying norms to facts. Even if they do not do so exactly as judges do, 
I think that they can acquire such additional knowledge and skills as might be 
required. Could they not arrange for the Legal Research and Training Institute to 
include law school faculty members in present classroom training or even for the 
Institute to create a special class for law faculty alone? If the Institute is unwilling, 
there are alternatives. If German legal methods are as close to Japanese ones as 
Japanese jurists have suggested to me, law faculty members with good German-
65) CJ, Hans Peter Marutschke, Juristenausbildung un Japan一 ausdeutscher Sicht, 18 Ritsumeikan 
Law Review, 87, 89 (2001) (,Die in Japan jetzt vorrangig gefuehrte Diskusssion um die 
Praxisorientierung der Juristenausbildung verkennt meines Erachtens, clas fuer eine gute praktische 
Anwendung des Rechts—und das soil ja in erster Linie das Ziel der Juristenausbildung sein一 ein
sicheres Verstaendnis der Grundlagen .. vorhanden ist. ") 
66) Acord, Peter Giles & Nikolaj Fischer, Juristena叫 ildung2003ー Zurneuesten Ausbildungsreformde-
batte in Deutschland, 20 Ritsumeikan Law Review 181, 200 (2003) ("clas das Leitbild fuer eine 
solche Juristenausbildung .. zugrundeliegt, das gebildete und flexible einarbeitungsfaehige Jurist sein 
soil, der weniger auf Wissen in moeglichst vielen Rechtsgebieten, sondem auf grundsaetzliches 
methodisches Verstaendnis hin ausgebildet warden ist."). 
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language skils could audit classes in Germany, much as I did twenty years ago. 
And, since such training in Germany is decentralized, there are many potential study 
centers. Even without going to Germany, there are numerous books that offer 
instruction in German legal methods. Finally, if your law faculties remain hesitant, I 
would remind them that the system of case law instruction that replaced law office 
training in the United States deliberately utilized professors who did not have 
practice experience. 67) 
Time does not allow me to address another important issue that you surely 
already are considering: what will be the relationship between the new law schools 
and the existing law faculties ?68) Will the new law schools drain the old law faculties 
of resources? What will happen to legal scholarship? Will law schools, as they have 
in America, train practitioners with good skils in argumentation but litle sense of 
system? That topic must await another day. 
Goseicho arigatou gozaimasita 
御清聴，有難うございました
67) CJ Justice System Reform Council, op. cit., Chap. III, Part 2, 2(2)e ("As practitioner-teachers, not 
only those included in the legal profession within a narrow sense, but also those who are otherwise 
qualified, should be broadly recruited.") 
68) Justice System Reform Council, op. cit. at Chap. III, Part 3, 2(l)c. (Universities must "[c]learly 
define the relationship between education provided at law schools and education provided at law 
faculties of umvers1t1es.") 
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